Apple has published a brochure Building a Trusted Ecosystem for Millions of Apps where they argue that the App Store is an important middleman that delivers safety to billions of people and that if people are allowed to load apps from random sourcesbad things™ would happen.
I respect many people at Apple who work real hard to push for better design and better technology. I also respect Apple as a commercial enterprise that knows how to make money that funds all that design and technology with scale and consistency.
Howeverwe should call propaganda for what it is. The App Store is not the important middleman that provides safety for the users. It is the design of the gadget itself that protects the owner and their data from malicious or malfunctioning code. Of coursethere are spots of imperfectionbut the App Store provides only a superficial and incomplete substitute for a solid technical solution within the design of the hardware and the software.
The principle
I’ll get to the boring commentary of the points made by the brochure belowbut before I’d like to remind you all of a principle formulated in 2010 by Ivan Krstić who still works on core security at Apple: “security driven by user intent”. At WWDC 2010Apple announced sandbox technology being brought from iPhone to the Mac. Ivan made an insightful presentation that explained the philosophy behind this:
- computers contain data of our entire lives,
- apps can be written by anyone and deployed over the internet,
- apps should not have access to all of user data by default,
- access to data should be driven by user intent so that the user always knows who has access to that data.
The most impressive example of applying this principle was “Open File” dialog in OS X Lion. Before sandboxingthe app would have access to the entire disk. When you want to open a filethe app would use a system framework within its address space to draw an “Open File” dialog to let user select a specific file. Within a sandboxthe app has only its own containerized folder (just like on every iPhone)plus a list of permissions granted to it by the kernel. The “Open File” dialog is no longer rendered by the appbut instead the system draws its own Finder window over the rectangle placeholder left by the app. What user sees is the same familiar experiencebut what happens behind the scenes is exactly what matches user’s intent: system-like dialog sees all files because the system has access to all these filesbut only the selected one is granted to the app. Same works for drag-and-drop: when a file is dropped to the appsystem grants access to that exact file.
The same principle works on the iPhone: when an app wants to select a file or a pictureit is the system dialog that appears and only the selected items are granted to the app. Same goes for the contacts in the address book. And since WWDC 2021there is even a location button that helps avoiding clunky Allow/Deny dialogs that annoy people and are not directly tied to intent and specific action. I’m eager to see this implemented for the camera and micso we can just press on/off buttons instead of being prompted whether we allow an app to spy on us indefinitely.
Ephemeral MAC addressesprivate relayone-time email addresses are all the technologiesnot policiesthat improve your security by minimizing leakage of private information.
As you have already noticedthis works for all appsno matter who developed and signed them: AppleApp Store or independent developers. It is the job of the operating system and hardware to keep your data safe and make sure apps do not interfere which each other. App Store is a nice service where you can find and easily buy/install applicationscompared to the wild webbut it is not and never be an effective guardian: only the operating system can do that job24/7 without any human supervision.
Boring commentary
We built the App Store to give developers from around the globe a place to build innovative apps that can reach a growing and thriving global community of over a billion users.
That is true: ease of use of App Store is what helps users spend money on appswhich is a great incentive for developers to build more and better.
Given the sheer scale of the App Store platformensuring iPhone security and safety was of critical importance to us from the start. Security researchers agree that iPhone is the safestmost secure mobile devicewhich allows our users to trust their devices with their most sensitive data.
That is also true: if everyone is keeping everything in their computers and installing millions of applications on themit is quite important to make computers secure at the core.
We built industry-leading security protections into the deviceand we created the App Storea trusted place where users can safely discover and download apps. On the App Storeapps come from known developers who have agreed to follow our guidelinesand are securely distributed to users free from interference from third parties. We review every single app and each app update to evaluate whether they meet our high standards. This processwhich we are constantly working to improveis designed to protect our users by keeping malwarecybercriminalsand scammers out of the App Store.
Notice how device security is placed on par with App Store policies. At their scale App Store is at best a “last resort” measure on top of the actual security provided by the device itself. There are and always will be people circumventing human-operated policies. HeckFacebook app is still shippingas far as I know.
Apps designed for children must follow strict guidelines around data collection and security designed to keep children safeand must be tightly integrated with iOS parental control features.
This paragraph fails to convince me why all adults must have crippled devices because that way kids are safer. Parents can turn on “kids mode” for their kids and not turn it on for themselves.
Apple reviews all apps and updates on the App Store to intercept those that could harm users. This includes apps that contain inappropriate content. [...]
Inappropriate content is another mind trick from a category “think of the children”. Inappropriate content has nothing to do with the security of your data and the number one application that contains all the inappropriate content in the world is a web browser that ships front and center with every computer.
A study found that devices that run on Android had 15 times more infections from malicious software than iPhonewith a key reason being that Android apps “can be downloaded from just about anywhere,” while everyday iPhone users can only download apps from one source: the App Store.
Nosorry. Android is not a single architectureit’s a piece of software that gets installed on random array of hardware. Most of shipping Android phones are generally cheap and less secure than iPhones.
That principle guides the high privacy standards we build into our products: we collect only the personal data strictly necessary to deliver a product or servicewe put the user in control by asking them for permission before apps can access sensitive dataand we provide clear indications when apps access certain sensitive features like the microphonecameraand the user’s location.
The access to data is managed by the system through (mostly) clever use of the principle “security driven by user intent” that I described above. It is actually a security hole to rely on some people with policies to manage data that’s flowing right in front of you on a computer that you have to trust anyway.
Todayit is extremely rare for any user to encounter malware on iPhone.
Yesbut not because of the App Store. See above.
Because of the large size of the iPhone user base and the sensitive data stored on their phones – photoslocation datahealth and financial information – allowing sideloading would spur a flood of new investment into attacks on the platform.
We have to compare this risk with the risks present on the web: if a bad app could ask you to give it access to some photosthe same could be done by a website.
On a Mac there is an optional notarization service that lets users have confidence that the app is from a developer known to Apple. So ifsaythey permit the photo editing application access to the entire photo library and then later it is discovered that the app goes rogueApple would be able to hold the developer by the balls in the legal realm. But that does not mean the developer cannot distribute the app directly to their users without anyone at App Store vetting it upfront.
A sideloaded game bypasses parental controls.
The entire page 5 is telling a story how hardware is not capable (actuallyit is) of enforcing parental controls. The hardest part is filtering the web trafficand that’s certainly not the App Store’s job. Alsoif App Store was optionalthere is no problem in having a switch on a phone “only allow apps from 6+ category on the App Store” and a passcode.
Apple defending App Store on the grounds of kids’ safety sounds very patronizing: there is only one adult in the whole Apple universeand all of you are children incapable of thinking for yourselves.
At the parkthe copy-cat filter app John had sideloaded threatens to delete all of his photos unless he pays up.
I think Apple should work on a native Bitcoin wallet built into the Keychainso John has a more convenient way to pay up a ransom. Currentlyif your phone lets an app to encrypt/delete all its datait is very annoying to register on Bitcoin exchangefile paperworkset up a walletread the whitepaper and learn how to back up your private keys. A decent built-in solution for ransomware would be most welcome in this dangerous world. After allwe are all used to pay ransom for PCR tests to move aroundand that’s marginally more convenient than ransomware.
John unknowingly downloads a pirated app from a third-party app store.
There is this thing called TLS and Certificate Transparency on the web designed for specifically this scenario. It is a federated (not centralized) systemand pretty much free of charge with little censorship risks (except in Kazakhstan).
A sideloaded app violates John’s privacy.
What the app actually does that cannot be controlled by the hardware is always going to be learned the hard way: after enough damage is done. One way to prevent and limit the damage is to have developers known. And this is achieved by having notarization and TLS-like trust chainsnot via a centralized distribution channelthat cannot learn about the app’s malicious behaviour during a 2-day review.
In addition to the protections provided by App Reviewwe design our devices’ hardware and software to provide a last line of defense in case a harmful app is downloaded on the device.
The best defense relies on a combination of all layers – robust App Review to help prevent the installation of malicious appsand robust platform protections to limit the damage malicious apps can inflict.
That is quite a statement. In the end of the brochure Apple claims that it is the App Store that’s doing all the heavyliftingand the security architecture is simply the last line of defense. I don’t remember when any of the infosec people I know would be praising Apple’s distribution system: it was always the top-notch technical solutions that provide robusteasy to understand security model: from the CPU architectureto Secure Enclaveto filesystem encryptioncontainerization and sandboxfine-grained permissions system up to intent-driven UI security.
The end result is that security experts agree iPhone is the safestmost secure mobile device. Apple’s many layers of security provide users with an unparalleled level of protection from malicious softwaregiving users peace of mind.
This closing paragraph is entirely truebut Apple is dishonestly making you think it’s their policing that keeps you safenot the clever engineering and design.