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Bypassing kernel Fac Anti Cheat
Old 11th March 202603:34 PM   #1
1337 H4x0!2

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Last Achievements Bypassing kernel Fac Anti Cheat
Bypassing kernel Fac Anti Cheat

Helloi am reversing FacDrv.sysand found out some good stuff: Physycal Pages Scan Until PDE
Code:
 char __fastcall PTEPAGETABLESPHYSICALSCAN_14000370C(HANDLE ProcessId)
{
  unsigned __int64 v1; // r13
  char v2; // r15
  PPHYSICAL_MEMORY_RANGE PhysicalMemoryRanges; // rax
  LARGE_INTEGER *p_NumberOfBytes; // r8
  LARGE_INTEGER NumberOfBytes; // rcx
  ULONG_PTR v7; // rdx
  ULONG_PTR v8; // rcx
  unsigned __int64 v9; // rdi
  unsigned __int64 v10; // r14
  _BYTE *v11; // rdx
  ULONG_PTR v12; // r8
  unsigned __int64 v13; // rcx
  _QWORD *v14; // r12
  unsigned __int64 i; // rsi
  unsigned __int64 v16; // rcx
  ULONG_PTR ViewSize; // [rsp+58h] [rbp-F0h] BYREF
  PVOID BaseAddress; // [rsp+60h] [rbp-E8h] BYREF
  PEPROCESS Process; // [rsp+68h] [rbp-E0h] BYREF
  void *SectionHandle[3]; // [rsp+70h] [rbp-D8h] BYREF
  struct _UNICODE_STRING DestinationString; // [rsp+88h] [rbp-C0h] BYREF
  struct _OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes; // [rsp+98h] [rbp-B0h] BYREF
  _DWORD Src[4]; // [rsp+C8h] [rbp-80h] BYREF
  __int64 v24; // [rsp+D8h] [rbp-70h]
  _KAPC_STATE ApcState; // [rsp+E0h] [rbp-68h] BYREF

  v1 = (unsigned int)ProcessId;
  v2 = 0;
  RtlInitUnicodeString(&DestinationStringL"\\Device\\PhysicalMemory");
  ObjectAttributes.Length = 48;
  ObjectAttributes.RootDirectory = 0LL;
  ObjectAttributes.Attributes = 576;
  ObjectAttributes.ObjectName = &DestinationString;
  *(_OWORD *)&ObjectAttributes.SecurityDescriptor = 0LL;
  if ( ZwOpenSection(SectionHandle0xF001Fu&ObjectAttributes) < 0 )
    return 0;
  BaseAddress = 0LL;
  ViewSize = 0LL;
  PhysicalMemoryRanges = MmGetPhysicalMemoryRanges();
  if ( PhysicalMemoryRanges )
  {
    p_NumberOfBytes = &PhysicalMemoryRanges->NumberOfBytes;
    NumberOfBytes = PhysicalMemoryRanges->NumberOfBytes;
    if ( NumberOfBytes.QuadPart )
    {
      v7 = ViewSize;
      do
      {
        v8 = p_NumberOfBytes[-1].QuadPart + NumberOfBytes.QuadPart;
        if ( v7 <= v8 )
          v7 = v8;
        ViewSize = v7;
        p_NumberOfBytes += 2;
        NumberOfBytes = *p_NumberOfBytes;
      }
      while ( p_NumberOfBytes->QuadPart );
    }
  }
  if ( ZwMapViewOfSection(
         SectionHandle[0],
         (HANDLE)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFLL,
         &BaseAddress,
         0LL,
         0LL,
         0LL,
         &ViewSize,
         ViewUnmap,
         0,
         4u) < 0 )
  {
    ZwClose(SectionHandle[0]);
    return 0;
  }
  Process = 0LL;
  if ( PsLookupProcessByProcessId((HANDLE)v1&Process) >= 0 )
  {
    KeStackAttachProcess(Process&ApcState);
    v9 = __readcr3();
    KeUnstackDetachProcess(&ApcState);
    v10 = ((unsigned __int64)MmSystemRangeStart >> 39) & 0x1FF;
    v11 = BaseAddress;
    v12 = ViewSize;
    while ( 1 )
    {
      SectionHandle[2] = (void *)v10;
      if ( v10 >= 0x200 )
        break;
      v13 = (v9 & 0xFFFFFFFFFF000LL) + 8 * v10;
      if ( v13 <= v12 )
      {
        v14 = &v11[v13];
        if ( (v11[v13] & 5) == 5 )
        {
          for ( i = ((unsigned __int64)MmSystemRangeStart >> 30) & 0x1FF; ; ++i )
          {
            SectionHandle[1] = (void *)i;
            if ( i >= 0x200 )
              break;
            v16 = (*v14 & 0xFFFFFFFFFF000LL) + 8 * i;
            if ( v16 <= v12 && (v11[v16] & 5) == 5 )
            {
              v2 = 1;
              Src[0] = 732997;
              Src[2] = v1;
              v24 = 0LL;
              LogAnomalyMaybe_113C(Src0x18uLL);
              v11 = BaseAddress;
              v12 = ViewSize;
            }
          }
        }
      }
      ++v10;
    }
    ObfDereferenceObject(Process);
  }
  ZwUnmapViewOfSection((HANDLE)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFLLBaseAddress);
  ZwClose(SectionHandle[0]);
  return v2;
}
Cache Table Scan:
Code:
char PICACHETABLE_3B78()
{
  char v0; // di
  char result; // al
  BOOLEAN i; // dl
  _OWORD *v3; // rax
  _OWORD *v4; // rbx
  PRTL_AVL_TABLE Table; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-E0h] BYREF
  PERESOURCE Resource[3]; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-D8h] BYREF
  int Src; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-C0h] BYREF
  char Dest[256]; // [rsp+50h] [rbp-B8h] BYREF
  int v9; // [rsp+150h] [rbp+48h]
  int v10; // [rsp+154h] [rbp+4Ch]

  v0 = 0;
  result = sub_3C74(Resource&Table);
  if ( result )
  {
    ExAcquireResourceExclusiveLite(Resource[0]1u);
    for ( i = 1; ; i = 0 )
    {
      v3 = RtlEnumerateGenericTableAvl(Tablei);
      v4 = v3;
      if ( !v3 )
        break;
      v0 = 1;
      Src = 160802;
      Dest[0] = 0;
      if ( *((_WORD *)v3 + 8) )
      {
        *(_OWORD *)&Resource[1] = v3[1];
        sub_1830(Dest255LL(const char *)qword_51F0&Resource[1]);
      }
      v10 = *((_DWORD *)v4 + 9);
      v9 = *((_DWORD *)v4 + 8);
      LogAnomalyMaybe_113C(&Src0x110uLL);
    }
    ExReleaseResourceLite(Resource[0]);
    return v0;
  }
  return result;
}
Code:
Handle Scan: char HandleScanner_1400039DC()
{
  _DWORD *v0; // rbx
  __int64 i; // rdi
  void *SectionHandle; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-80h] BYREF
  PVOID Object[2]; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-78h] BYREF
  struct _UNICODE_STRING DestinationString; // [rsp+50h] [rbp-68h] BYREF
  struct _OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes; // [rsp+60h] [rbp-58h] BYREF
  _DWORD Src[4]; // [rsp+90h] [rbp-28h] BYREF

  v0 = HandleEnumerator_140002808();
  Object[1] = v0;
  if ( v0 )
  {
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&DestinationStringL"\\Device\\PhysicalMemory");
    ObjectAttributes.Length = 48;
    ObjectAttributes.RootDirectory = 0LL;
    ObjectAttributes.Attributes = 576;
    ObjectAttributes.ObjectName = &DestinationString;
    *(_OWORD *)&ObjectAttributes.SecurityDescriptor = 0LL;
    if ( ZwOpenSection(&SectionHandle0xF001Fu&ObjectAttributes) >= 0 )
    {
      if ( ObReferenceObjectByHandle(SectionHandle1u0LL0Object0LL) >= 0 )
      {
        ZwClose(SectionHandle);
        for ( i = 0LL; (unsigned int)i < *v0; i = (unsigned int)(i + 1) )
        {
          if ( v0[5 * i + 1] != 4
            && *(PVOID *)&v0[5 * i + 3] == Object[0]
            && !ObIsKernelHandle((HANDLE)HIWORD(v0[5 * i + 2])) )
          {
            Src[0] = 666454;
            Src[2] = v0[5 * i + 1];
            Src[3] = v0[5 * i + 5];
            LogAnomalyMaybe_113C(Src0x10uLL);
          }
        }
        ObfDereferenceObject(Object[0]);
        ExFreePoolWithTag(v00x74434146u);
      }
      else
      {
        ExFreePoolWithTag(v00x74434146u);
        ZwClose(SectionHandle);
      }
    }
  }
  return 0;
}  Thread Start And Module Check: char __fastcall ThreadModuleScanner_33A0(void *a1_OWORD *a2)
{
  unsigned int *ModuleInfomation; // rax
  PETHREAD Thread; // [rsp+38h] [rbp+10h] BYREF
  unsigned __int64 ThreadInformation; // [rsp+40h] [rbp+18h] BYREF

  if ( a2
    && PsLookupThreadByThreadId(a1&Thread) >= 0
    && PsIsSystemThread(Thread)
    && (OutThreadStartAddress_46F0(Thread&ThreadInformation)ThreadInformation)
    && (ModuleInfomation = (unsigned int *)ModuleInfomration_14000325C()) != 0LL )
  {
    return ThreadKernelScannerModule_32C4(ModuleInfomationThreadInformationa2);
  }
  else
  {
    return 0;
  }
}
GUID indetifier:
Code:
void __fastcall GuidIdentifier_4784(__int64 a1)
{
  unsigned __int16 *PoolWithTag; // rax
  unsigned __int16 *v3; // r14

  *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 8) = 0xC0000022;
  PoolWithTag = (unsigned __int16 *)ExAllocatePoolWithTag(NonPagedPool0x1000uLL'enoN');
  v3 = PoolWithTag;
  if ( PoolWithTag )
  {
    if ( ZwQuerySystemInformation(SystemBootEnvironmentInformationPoolWithTag0x1000u0LL) >= 0 )
    {
      *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 8) = 0;
      sub_1830(
        (char *)(a1 + 12),
        256LL,
        "%08X-%04X-%04X-%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X",
        *(_DWORD *)v3,
        v3[2],
        v3[3],
        *((unsigned __int8 *)v3 + 8),
        *((unsigned __int8 *)v3 + 9),
        *((unsigned __int8 *)v3 + 10),
        *((unsigned __int8 *)v3 + 11),
        *((unsigned __int8 *)v3 + 12),
        *((unsigned __int8 *)v3 + 13),
        *((unsigned __int8 *)v3 + 14),
        *((unsigned __int8 *)v3 + 15));
    }
    ExFreePoolWithTag(v30x656E6F4Eu);
  }
}
editadding driver enumeration:
Code:
char DriverEnum_1494()
{
  __int64 ObjectType; // rbx
  _QWORD *PoolWithTag; // rdi
  unsigned int *v2; // rbx
  __int16 *v3; // rcx
  __int64 v4; // r8
  __int64 v5; // rdx
  __int16 v6; // ax
  __int64 v7; // rax
  int HandleInformation; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-D8h]
  PVOID v10; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-C0h] BYREF
  ULONG Context[2]; // [rsp+50h] [rbp-B8h] BYREF
  HANDLE Handle; // [rsp+58h] [rbp-B0h] BYREF
  void *DirectoryHandle; // [rsp+60h] [rbp-A8h] BYREF
  PVOID Object; // [rsp+68h] [rbp-A0h] BYREF
  _WORD v15[4]; // [rsp+70h] [rbp-98h] BYREF
  __int128 *v16; // [rsp+78h] [rbp-90h]
  _OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes; // [rsp+80h] [rbp-88h] BYREF
  _UNICODE_STRING DestinationString; // [rsp+B0h] [rbp-58h] BYREF
  __int128 v19; // [rsp+C8h] [rbp-40h] BYREF
  __int128 v20; // [rsp+D8h] [rbp-30h] BYREF
  __int128 v21; // [rsp+E8h] [rbp-20h] BYREF
  int Src; // [rsp+F8h] [rbp-10h] BYREF
  char Dest[262]; // [rsp+100h] [rbp-8h] BYREF
  __int16 v24; // [rsp+206h] [rbp+FEh] BYREF
  __int128 v25; // [rsp+208h] [rbp+100h] BYREF
  __int16 v26; // [rsp+218h] [rbp+110h]
  _BYTE Dst[182]; // [rsp+21Ah] [rbp+112h] BYREF

  if ( IoDriverObjectType )
  {
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&DestinationStringL"\\Driver");
    ObjectAttributes.Length = 48;
    ObjectAttributes.ObjectName = &DestinationString;
    ObjectAttributes.RootDirectory = 0LL;
    ObjectAttributes.Attributes = 576;
    *(_OWORD *)&ObjectAttributes.SecurityDescriptor = 0LL;
    if ( ZwOpenDirectoryObject(&DirectoryHandle1u&ObjectAttributes) >= 0
      && ObReferenceObjectByHandle(DirectoryHandle1u0LL0&Object0LL) >= 0 )
    {
      NtClose(DirectoryHandle);
      ObjectType = ObGetObjectType(Object);
      ObfDereferenceObject(Object);
      if ( (int)ObOpenObjectByName(&ObjectAttributesObjectType0LL0LL10LL&Handle) >= 0 )
      {
        PoolWithTag = ExAllocatePoolWithTag(NonPagedPool0x1000uLL0x74434146u);
        if ( PoolWithTag )
        {
          v2 = (unsigned int *)ModuleInfomration_14000325C();
          if ( v2 )
          {
            Context[0] = 0;
            while ( ZwQueryDirectoryObject(HandlePoolWithTag0x1000u1u0Context&Context[1]) >= 0 )
            {
              v26 = 0;
              v25 = xmmword_51D0;
              memset(Dst0sizeof(Dst));
              v3 = &v24;
              do
                ++v3;
              while ( *v3 );
              v4 = PoolWithTag[1];
              v5 = 0LL;
              do
              {
                v6 = *(_WORD *)(v4 + 2 * v5);
                v3[v5++] = v6;
              }
              while ( v6 );
              v7 = -1LL;
              do
                ++v7;
              while ( *((_WORD *)&v25 + v7) );
              v15[1] = 2 * v7;
              v15[0] = 2 * v7;
              v16 = &v25;
              LOBYTE(HandleInformation) = 0;
              if ( (int)ObReferenceObjectByName(v15576LL0LL0LLIoDriverObjectTypeHandleInformation0LL&v10) >= 0 )
              {
                if ( sub_3408(v2*((_QWORD *)v10 + 28)) == 1 )
                {
                  Src = 0x62514;
                  v19 = *(_OWORD *)((char *)v10 + 56);
                  sub_1830(Dest255LL"%wZ"&v19);
                  LogAnomalyMaybe_113C(&Src0x108uLL);
                }
                if ( sub_3408(v2*((_QWORD *)v10 + 3)) == 1 )
                {
                  Src = 542066;
                  v20 = *(_OWORD *)((char *)v10 + 56);
                  sub_1830(Dest255LL"%wZ"&v20);
                  LogAnomalyMaybe_113C(&Src0x108uLL);
                }
                if ( sub_3408(v2*((_QWORD *)v10 + 10)) == 1 )
                {
                  Src = 75317;
                  v21 = *(_OWORD *)((char *)v10 + 56);
                  sub_1830(Dest255LL"%wZ"&v21);
                  LogAnomalyMaybe_113C(&Src0x108uLL);
                }
                ObfDereferenceObject(v10);
              }
            }
            ExFreePoolWithTag(v20x74434146u);
            ExFreePoolWithTag(PoolWithTag0x74434146u);
            ZwClose(Handle);
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
  return 0;
}
So i would like to askhow do i bypass thishow do i hide from PD scan,hadnle and thread scan... i can easily understand what they are doing but from the kernel its not really clear how to bypass itin the sense that in usermode you can just hoo etc.... but here DKOM is detected by PGcan someone experienced suggest me some things to learn etc... thanks a lot Edit the funxtion where I wrote Report maybenow i am surebut its protected by vmp obviosuly...

Last edited by bigslim04; 11th March 2026 at 04:57 PM.
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Old 11th March 202604:41 PM   #2
n00bie

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can you share the .sys file to take a look?
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Old 11th March 202606:39 PM   #3
1337 H4x0!2

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No way

No way... after starting the game i was able to just suspend the service a d the driver also gets automatically stopped and it doesnt kick lolll... it had even some nice ideas but they really fell hard not even an heartbeat?? still i would be interested in some informationand also they che k for test significa modehow would i kill that detection and be able to load the game even with it? Cause even withouth the anti cheat i need to load a driver to remove the callbacks

Last edited by bigslim04; 11th March 2026 at 06:42 PM.
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Old 12th March 202604:33 PM   #4
1337 H4x0!2

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Someone?
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Old 12th March 202606:55 PM   #5
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Quote:
Originally Posted by bigslim04 View Post
Someone?
You can hook their driver if they have no check for integrityPG does not protect their executable sections
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Old 12th March 202608:03 PM   #6
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(i dont know if the offsets will be the same in your case since you didnt share the .sys file)
obcallback for handles is at 0x1d80 (or look for byte pattern 488b0d2d530000 ; or just use windbg)
at the start of that function you can see a few check of the global protected process structure they use . Setting the u64 value at offset 0x70d0 is enough to fail the check and avoid the handle stripping.
assembly code:

Code:
00001d80  48895c2408         mov     qword [rsp+0x8 {__saved_rbx}]rbx
00001d85  55                 push    rbp {__saved_rbp}
00001d86  56                 push    rsi {__saved_rsi}
00001d87  57                 push    rdi {__saved_rdi}
00001d88  4883ec40           sub     rsp0x40
00001d8c  488b0d2d530000     mov     rcxqword [rel data_70c0]
00001d93  488bda             mov     rbxrdx
00001d96  4885c9             test    rcxrcx
00001d99  750d               jne     0x1da8

00001d9b  48390d26530000     cmp     qword [rel data_70c8]rcx
00001da2  0f84fb000000       je      0x1ea3  {data_70c8}

00001da8  48833d2053000000   cmp     qword [rel data_70d0]0x0 ; here one cmp
00001db0  0f84ed000000       je      0x1ea3  {data_70d0}

00001db6  833d2f53000000     cmp     dword [rel data_70ec]0x0
00001dbd  0f85e0000000       jne     0x1ea3  {data_70ec}
why 0x70d0 and not the other values? because it is just one 8 bytes patch which is easier than multiplebut you can set to 0 the u64 values at 0x70c0 and 0x70c8

that's up to you. With that single dkom you disable the handle protection
enjoy

Last edited by BelleLovesU; 12th March 2026 at 08:04 PM.
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Old 12th March 202608:15 PM   #7
1337 H4x0!2

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Thanksbut I already disabled the callbacks through putting pre operation to a dummyi used a leaked certificate for the driver and signed with it. But am I wrong or those type of detections basically target and detect mostly mapped driversor obviously injected dlls? Lets say i wanted to bypass thosehow would you act if you were to map the driver instead? How would you hide allocations etc? I didnt share the sys because i see no reasonits literally the same on every Fac protected gameso if you have that its the samethanks all of you for the help!�� edit: lol yeah I found exactly the part you postedwhere if i recall 70C0 is the qword that holds the protected pidaltitude of the callbacks=1000 i filtered through thatnow i already found view matrixcoords etc.. but pointer scan doesnt seem to workdo you have the same problem? It just returns zero results

Quote:
Originally Posted by Hec4te View Post
You can hook their driver if they have no check for integrityPG does not protect their executable sections
Really? I didnt know it,lol really you can hook parts inside the driver and Force ifs etc.. if they have no check? Thanks bro

Last edited by bigslim04; 12th March 2026 at 08:22 PM.
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Old 12th March 202608:28 PM   #8
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i dont know what are you talking aboutI just installed one game got the .sys and dropped it on my debugging vmi havent even open the gameso i dont know anything about the view matrix problemsetc you mention.

i wouldn't map any driver or hide allocationsi would just use a vulnerable driver with kernel memory rw and i would just patch the needed memory vars/structures

(avoid code patching)

Last edited by BelleLovesU; 12th March 2026 at 08:29 PM.
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Old 12th March 202608:32 PM   #9
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bigslim04 Just put a down payment on his fire-wallbigslim04 Just put a down payment on his fire-wallbigslim04 Just put a down payment on his fire-wallbigslim04 Just put a down payment on his fire-wallbigslim04 Just put a down payment on his fire-wallbigslim04 Just put a down payment on his fire-wall
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Originally Posted by BelleLovesU View Post
i dont know what are you talking aboutI just installed one game got the .sys and dropped it on my debugging vmi havent even open the gameso i dont know anything about the view matrix problemsetc you mention.

i wouldn't map any driver or hide allocationsi would just use a vulnerable driver with kernel memory rw and i would just patch the needed memory vars/structures

(avoid code patching)
oh ok didnt know you hadnt playedyeah the anti cheat is not that hard but its not even super badanyway yeah thats what I would do toowas just curiousityand the pointer thing is the only thing thats breaking it a bit for mebecause I cannot get any chains at allanyway if you have cert i dont think this requires vulnerable driver at all

Last edited by bigslim04; 12th March 2026 at 08:37 PM.
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